### PIC

#### 1. The role of the ballot is to answer the resolutional question “whether topical action is better than the status quo or competitive option”

#### “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

**Army Officer School 2005**

(“# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, 5-12, <http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm>)

The colon introduces the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### Resolved means enact policy

**Words and Phrases 1964** Permanent Edition

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### “United States Federal Government should” means the debate is solely about the outcome of a policy established by governmental means

Ericson, 03 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### 2. The aff claims to win the debate for reasons other than the desirability of topical action

#### 3. Vote Negative:

#### A. Deliberative decision making

#### Debate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis—that’s key to avoid a devolution of debate into competing truth claims, which destroys the decision-making benefits of the activity

Steinberg and Freeley**,** Miami communication studies lecturer and Boston based attorney**, 2008**

(David and Austin, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, pg 45)

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Deliberation is the best model-continual testing bolsters advocacy and inclusion-this means both tams create better methods of engagement to resolve the AFF but the aff doesn’t resolve this offense-only switching sides on a point of stasis maximizes this potential

**Talisse, Vanderbilt philosophy professor, 2005**

(Robert, “Deliberativist responses to activist challenges”, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 31.4, project muse)

Nonetheless, the deliberativist conception of reasonableness differs from the activist’s in at least one crucial respect. On the deliberativist view, a necessary condition for reasonableness is the willingness not only to offer justifications for one’s own views and actions, but also to listen to criticisms, objections, and the justificatory reasons that can be given in favor of alternative proposals. In light of this further stipulation, we may say that, on the deliberative democrat’s view, reasonable citizens are responsive to reasons, their views are ‘reason tracking’. Reasonableness, then, entails an acknowledgement on the part of the citizen that her current views are possibly mistaken, incomplete, and in need of revision. Reasonableness is hence a two-way street: the reasonable citizen is able and willing to offer justifications for her views and actions, but is also prepared to consider alternate views, respond to criticism, answer objections, and, if necessary, revise or abandon her views. In short, reasonable citizens do not only believe and act for reasons, they aspire to believe and act according to the best reasons; consequently, they recognize their own fallibility in weighing reasons and hence engage in public deliberation in part for the sake of improving their views.15 ‘Reasonableness’ as the deliberative democrat understands it is constituted by a willingness to participate in an ongoing public discussion that inevitably involves processes of self-examination by which one at various moments rethinks and revises one’s views in light of encounters with new arguments and new considerations offered by one’s fellow deliberators. Hence Gutmann and Thompson write: Citizens who owe one another justifications for the laws that they seek to impose must take seriously the reasons their opponents give. Taking seriously the reasons one’s opponents give means that, at least for a certain range of views that one opposes, one must acknowledge the possibility that an opposing view may be shown to be correct in the future. This acknowledgement has implications not only for the way they regard their own views. It imposes an obligation to continue to test their own views, seeking forums in which the views can be challenged, and keeping open the possibility of their revision or even rejection.16 (2000: 172) That Young’s activist is not reasonable in this sense is clear from the ways in which he characterizes his activism. He claims that ‘Activities of protest, boycott, and disruption are more appropriate means for getting citizens to think seriously about what until then they have found normal and acceptable’ (106); activist tactics are employed for the sake of ‘bringing attention’ to injustice and making ‘a wider public aware of institutional wrongs’ (107). These characterizations suggest the presumption that questions of justice are essentially settled; the activist takes himself to know what justice is and what its implementation requires. He also believes he knows that those who oppose him are either the power-hungry beneficiaries of the unjust status quo or the inattentive and unaware masses who do not ‘think seriously’ about the injustice of the institutions that govern their lives and so unwittingly accept them. Hence his political activity is aimed exclusively at enlisting other citizens in support of the cause to which he is tenaciously committed. The activist implicitly holds that there could be no reasoned objection to his views concerning justice, and no good reason to endorse those institutions he deems unjust. The activist presumes to know that no deliberative encounter could lead him to reconsider his position or adopt a different method of social action; he ‘declines’ to ‘engage persons he disagrees with’ (107) in discourse because he has judged on a priori grounds that all opponents are either pathetically benighted or balefully corrupt. When one holds one’s view as the only responsible or just option, there is no need for reasoning with those who disagree, and hence no need to be reasonable. According to the deliberativist, this is the respect in which the activist is unreasonable. The deliberativist recognizes that questions of justice are difficult and complex. This is the case not only because justice is a notoriously tricky philosophical concept, but also because, even supposing we had a philosophically sound theory of justice, questions of implementation are especially thorny. Accordingly, political philosophers, social scientists, economists, and legal theorists continue to work on these questions. In light of much of this literature, it is difficult to maintain the level of epistemic confidence in one’s own views that the activist seems to muster; thus the deliberativist sees the activist’s confidence as evidence of a lack of honest engagement with the issues. A possible outcome of the kind of encounter the activist ‘declines’ (107) is the realization that the activist’s image of himself as a ‘David to the Goliath of power wielded by the state and corporate actors’ (106) is naïve. That is, the deliberativist comes to see, through processes of public deliberation, that there are often good arguments to be found on all sides of an important social issue; reasonableness hence demands that one must especially engage the reasons of those with whom one most vehemently disagrees and be ready to revise one’s own views if necessary. Insofar as the activist holds a view of justice that he is unwilling to put to the test of public criticism, he is unreasonable. Furthermore, insofar as the activist’s conception commits him to the view that there could be no rational opposition to his views, he is literally unable to be reasonable. Hence the deliberative democrat concludes that activism, as presented by Young’s activist, is an unreasonable model of political engagement. The dialogical conception of reasonableness adopted by the deliberativist also provides a response to the activist’s reply to the charge that he is engaged in interest group or adversarial politics. Recall that the activist denied this charge on the grounds that activism is aimed not at private or individual interests, but at the universal good of justice. But this reply also misses the force of the posed objection. On the deliberativist view, the problem with interest-based politics does not derive simply from the source (self or group), scope (particular or universal), or quality (admirable or deplorable) of the interest, but with the concept of interests as such. Not unlike ‘preferences’, ‘interests’ typically function in democratic theory as fixed dispositions that are non-cognitive and hence unresponsive to reasons. Insofar as the activist sees his view of justice as ‘given’ and not open to rational scrutiny, he is engaged in the kind of adversarial politics the deliberativist rejects. The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. The deliberativist view I have sketched holds that reasonableness involves some degree of what we may call epistemic modesty. On this view, the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons, and so she enters into public discourse as a way of testing her views against the objections and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly holds that her present view is open to reasonable critique and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justifications for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness for the activist consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reflection seem adequate to underwrite action; discussion with those who disagree need not be involved. According to the activist, there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which there is no room for reasoned objection. Under such conditions, the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational. It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001a: ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies, demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. Activists also must engage in deliberation among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movements must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tactics; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists. Group polarization is a well-documented phenomenon that has ‘been found all over the world and in many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81–2). Importantly, in groups that ‘engage in repeated discussions’ over time, the polarization is even more pronounced (2003: 86). Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of any individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.).17 The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees in cases in which the requirements of justice are so clear that he can be confident that he has the truth. Group polarization suggests that deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even when we have the truth. For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views, but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree, our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth. In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggests that engagement with those with whom one disagrees is essential to the proper pursuit of justice. Insofar as the activist denies this, he is unreasonable

#### Effective deliberative discourse is the lynchpin to solving all existential social and political problems

**Lundberg,** UNC Chapel Hill communications professor, 20**10**

(Christian, Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century, pg 311-3)

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical •outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by •debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modern political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change out pacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to re-articulation, it is open to re-articulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Dewey in The Public and Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63,154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to sort through and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly information-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, 140) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multi-mediated information environment (ibid.), Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instruction/no instruction and debate topic ... that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned... students in the Instructional [debate] group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so.... These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in [debate] These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthen and Gaylen Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthen and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical-thinking skills, research and information-skills, oral-communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded, and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life. Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens who can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive and to deal with systemic threats that risk our collective extinction. Democratic societies face a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention, and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization, including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy in an increasingly complex world. Given the challenge of perfecting our collective political skill, and in drawing on the best of our collective creative intelligence, it is incumbent on us to both make the case for and, more important, to do the concrete work to realize an expanded commitment to debate at colleges and universities.

#### B. Dialogue

#### Maintaining even division of ground and contestability is key to maintain debate’s unique potential for educational dialogue-alternative interpretations-guarantee uneducational monologues.

**Hanghoj**, Aarhus education assistant professor**, 2008**

(Thorkild, “Playful Knowledge An Explorative Study of Educational Gaming”, <http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information_til/Studerende_ved_SDU/Din_uddannelse/phd_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf>)

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### Dialogue is the biggest impact—the process of discussion precedes any truth claim by magnifying the benefits of any discussion

**Morson, Northwestern professor, 2004**

(Gary, Bakhtinian Perspectives on Language, Literacy, and Learning (Learning in Doing: Social, Cognitive and Computational Perspectives), pg 330-2)

A belief in truly dialogic ideological becoming would lead to schools that were quite different. In such schools, the mind would be populated with a complexity of voices and perspectives it had not known, and the student would learn to think with those voices, to test ideas and experiences against them, and to shape convictions that are innerly persuasive in response. This very process would be central. Students would sense that whatever word they believed to be innerly persuasive was only tentatively so: the process of dialogue continues.We must keep the conversation going, and formal education only initiates the process. The innerly persuasive discourse would not be final, but would be, like experience itself, ever incomplete and growing. As Bakhtin observes of the innerly persuasive word: Its creativity and productiveness consist precisely in the fact that such a word awakens new and independent words, that it organizes masses of our words from within, and does not remain in an isolated and static condition. It is not so much interpreted by us as it is further, that is, freely, developed, applied to new material, new conditions; it enters into interanimating relationships with new contexts. . . . The semantic structure of an innerly persuasive discourse is not finite, it is open; in each of the new contexts that dialogize it, this discourse is able to reveal ever newer ways to mean. (DI, 345–6) We not only learn, we also learn to learn, and we learn to learn best when we engage in a dialogue with others and ourselves. We appropriate the world of difference, and ourselves develop new potentials. Those potentials allow us to appropriate yet more voices. Becoming becomes endless becoming. We talk, we listen, and we achieve an open-ended wisdom. Difference becomes an opportunity (see Freedman and Ball, this volume). Our world manifests the spirit that Bakhtin attributed to Dostoevsky: “nothing conclusive has yet taken place in the world, the ultimate word of the world and about the world has not yet been spoken, the world is open and free, everything is in the future and will always be in the future.”3 Such a world becomes our world within, its dialogue lives within us, and we develop the potentials of our ever-learning selves. Letmedraw some inconclusive conclusions, which may provoke dialogue. Section I of this volume, “Ideologies in Dialogue: Theoretical Considerations” and Bakhtin’s thought in general suggest that we learn best when we are actually learning to learn. We engage in dialogue with ourselves and others, and the most important thing is the value of the open-ended process itself. Section II, “Voiced, Double Voiced, and Multivoiced Discourses in Our Schools” suggests that a belief in truly dialogic ideological becoming would lead to schools that were quite different. In such schools, the mind would be populated with a complexity of voices and perspectives it had not known, and the student would learn to think with those voices, to test ideas and experiences against them, and to shape convictions that are innerly persuasive in response. Teachers would not be trying to get students to hold the right opinions but to sense the world from perspectives they would not have encountered or dismissed out of hand. Students would develop the habit of getting inside the perspectives of other groups and other people. Literature in particular is especially good at fostering such dialogic habits. Section III, “Heteroglossia in a Changing World” may invite us to learn that dialogue involves really listening to others, hearing them not as our perspective would categorize what they say, but as they themselves would categorize what they say, and only then to bring our own perspective to bear. We talk, we listen, and we achieve an open-ended wisdom. The chapters in this volume seem to suggest that we view learning as a perpetual process. That was perhaps Bakhtin’s favorite idea: that to appreciate life, or dialogue, we must see value not only in achieving this or that result, but also in recognizing that honest and open striving in a world of uncertainty and difference is itself the most important thing. What we must do is keep the conversation going.

### 1nc

#### Text: The negative team advocates the entirety of the 1AC sans the use of personal pronouns.

#### Personal pronouns necessitate destructive dichotomies which assures violence, the adherence to grammatical rules makes rhizomatic politics impossible

Schantz 9 (ORLA SCHANTZ writes for the enlightenment underground, “The Urdoxa of Personal Pronouns” <http://enlightenmentunderground.blogspot.com/2009/03/urdoxa-of-personal-pronouns_28.html>)

Grammar has always been the fearful guardian against the chaos of language, the general commanding the unruly troops. A system of indoctrination, created by meticulous bureaucrats in the service of the State (clergy, literati, linguistic accountants, and pedants). Grammar is not to be believed, but to be obeyed. In education when a teacher explains the rules, no information is communicated, instead orders are given. **If language is water, grammar is ice.** The personal pronouns as graphic entities came relatively late in Indo-European languages, but have since reigned supreme. And along with it the subject became the Cartesian king. Andthe object the ambitious prince, always trying to usurp the power of the throne**.** However**, when the first homo sapiens spied a member of a different tribe, he cried out and defined the fatal creation of The Other. The dualism between, the attraction and enmity** of the two have **since bedeviled thinking, always creating** destructive dichotomies**.** Squeezed in in the space, left open, **the verb insisted on its rightful place as the doer.** It meant action. The verb also came in Harlequin clothing with many patchworks of colors**.** One of them threatened the subject: the infinitive. Verbs in the infinitive have the courage to challenge the hierarchical power structure. True revolutionaries**!** No longer is “the subject” the dictator, and no more can “the object” claim its right as heir apparent. In fact, verbs in the infinitive are limitless becomings, blissfully ignoring the personal pronoun of the subject. Infinite-becomings have no “fathers”, only referring to an “it” of the event = it is raining - or thinking. Infinitives are too busy becoming, too action-orientated, too much process, too few (if any) products. Becomings which both await the missing subject and precede it**. Thinking in the infinitive means transcending personal pronouns.** To die, to live, to love, to ponder, to do. **Never-ending flux** and flows**. Personal pronouns breed opposition, the dreaded cul-de-sacs of discussion which never finds its way, always** losing direction and purpose**. Personal pronouns demand numbers: three of them. Singular and plural.** What about a fourth or more? **Grammar is Stalinistic and tolerates no insurgents or dissidents**, yetthis is what it needs to survive outside of the Gulag**.** Where Urdoxa provides “stable entities” out in the world that corresponds to distinct faculties, paradox points to the unstable character of the relationship of language and world. Representation **is exactly this: a second version: a RE of what is presented, and consequently a fraud of a fraud. Language is always more than language. Or better, language is always more than representation. It spills over into the world, woven, as it is, into the world in order to be able to function as representation.** This quilt requires paradoxes of sense and nonsense that escape the grasp of language. But **personal pronouns don’t care,** having secured their place in human communication. There is no escape. **And so, dualisms fester like virus when they could** thrive as rhizom

### Case

#### Violence has massively decreased because of econ growth/modernization/interdependence- best data proves

**Gat,** Tel Aviv political science professor, **2012**

(Azar, “Is war declining – and why?” Journal of Peace Research, December, SAGE)

When quite a number of scholars simultaneously and independently of one another arrive at very similar conclusions on an issue of cardinal theoretical and practical significance, their thesis **deserves**, and has received, **great attention**. The thesis is that war and violence in general have progressively decreased in recent times, during the modern era, and even throughout history**.** Of course, despite their unanimity, all these scholars could still be wrong. Indeed, each of them tells a similar story of people’s disbelief at their findings, most notably that we live in the most peaceful period in human history. Some of them even explain the general incredulity by the findings of evolutionary psychology according to which we tend to be overly optimistic about ourselves but overly pessimistic about the world at large. Having myself written about the marked decrease in deadly human violence (Gat, 2006), I agree with the authors’ general thesis. However, their unanimity falters over, and they are less clear about, the historical trajectory of and the reasons for the decline in violence and war, questions that are as important as the general thesis itself. Previous Section Next Section Hobbes was right, and Rousseau wrong, about the state of nature Steven Pinker’s The Better Angels of Our Nature (2011) towers above all the other books surveyed here in size, scope, boldness, and scholarly excellence. It has deservedly attracted great public attention and has become a best-seller. Massively documented, this 800-page volume is lavishly furnished with statistics, charts, and diagrams, which are one of the book’s most effective features. The book, spanning the whole human past as far back as our aboriginal condition, points to two major steps in the decline of violence. The first is the sharp decline in violent mortality which resulted from the rise of the state-Leviathan from around 5,000 years ago. This conclusion is based on the most comprehensive studies of the subject published over the past 15 years (Keeley, 1996; LeBlanc, 2003; Gat, 2006), which demonstrate on the basis of anthropological and archaeological evidence that Hobbes’s picture of the anarchic state of nature as a very violent one was fundamentally true. Pinker rightly summarizes that violent mortality with the rise of states dropped from a staggering estimated 15% of the population, 25% of the men, in pre-state societies, to about 1–5%. The main reason for this drop is the enforcement of internal peace by the Leviathan, but also, less noted by Pinker, lower mobilization rates and a smaller exposure of the civilian population to war than with tribal groups, as will be explained shortly. This conclusion regarding the dramatic drop in violent mortality with the transition to the state is at odds with the claim made by Jack Levy & William Thompson in their book, The Arc of War (2011). As the book’s title implies, Levy & Thompson posit a great increase in warfare during history, before a decrease during the past two centuries. Thus, the book claims that mortality in fighting greatly increased, ‘accelerated’ in the authors’ language, with the transition to the state. They reach this conclusion by making several mistaken assumptions. First, although professing ignorance about the distant past because of the lack of evidence on the behavior of hunter-gatherer societies before the adoption of agriculture some 10,000 years ago, they cite and are heavily influenced by the old Rousseauite anthropology of the generation after the 1960s, which recent studies have refuted. Obviously, one does not have to accept the above findings regarding the pervasiveness and great lethality of prehistoric warfare. But Levy & Thompson simply do not engage with them. They accept as true the Rousseauite premise that sparse human population could not possibly have had that much to fight about. However, recently extant hunter-gatherer societies prove the opposite. Australia is our best laboratory of hunter-gatherer societies, because that vast continent was entirely populated by them and ‘unpolluted’ by agriculturalists, pastoralists or states until the arrival of the Europeans in 1788. And the evidence shows that the Australian tribes fought incessantly with one another. Even in the Central Australian Desert, whose population density was as low as one person per 35 square miles, among the lowest there is, conflict and deadly fighting were the rule. Much of that fighting centered on the water-holes vital for survival in this area, with the violent death rate there reckoned to have been several times higher than in any state society. In most other places, hunting territories were monopolized and fiercely defended by hunter-gatherers because they were quickly depleted. Even among the Inuit of Arctic Canada, who were so sparse as to experience no resource competition, fighting to kidnap women was pervasive, resulting in a violent death rate 10 times higher than the USA’s peak rate of 1990, itself the highest in the developed world. In more hospitable and densely populated environments casualties averaged, as already mentioned, 15% of the population and 25% of the men, and the surviving men were covered with scars (Gat, 2006: chs 2, 6). We are not dealing here with a piece of exotic curiosity. Ninety-five percent of the history of our species Homo sapiens sapiens – people who are like us – was spent as hunter-gatherers. The transition to agriculture and the state is very recent, the tip of the iceberg, in human history. Furthermore, the human state of nature turns out to be no different than the state of nature in general. Here too, science has made a complete turnabout. During the 1960s people believed that animals did not kill each other within the same species, which made humans appear like a murderous exception and fed speculations that warfare emerged only with civilization. Since then, however, it has been found that animals kill each other extensively within species, a point pressed on every viewer of television nature documentaries. There is nothing special about humans in this regard. Thus, lethal human fighting did not ‘emerge’ at some point in history, as Levy & Thompson posit. Previous Section Next Section Violent death sharply decreased with the rise of the Leviathan As mentioned earlier and as Pinker well realizes, violent mortality actually dropped steeply with the emergence of the state-Leviathan. Here is where Levy & Thompson make a second mistake. For measuring the lethality of warfare they use evidence of battle mortality, but this is highly misleading for various reasons. First, pre-state tribes’ main fighting modes were not the battle but the raid and the ambush – capturing the enemy by surprise and often annihilating entire sleeping camps: men, women, and children. Second, the size of battles merely indicates the size of the states and their armies, which are obviously larger than tribal groups in absolute terms. Yet the main question is relative casualties, what percentage of the population died violently. And here the fact is that while states and their armies grew by a factor of tens, hundreds, and thousands, giving a spectacular impression of large-scale fighting, relative casualties actually decreased under the state, and not only because of internal peace. Indeed, casualties decreased precisely because states grew large. Take Egypt, for example, part of the ‘acceleration’ of war with the emergence of states in Mesopotamia, Egypt, Greece, and China, according to Levy & Thompson. The size of the Egyptian army with which Pharaoh Ramses II fought the Hittite empire at the Battle of Kadesh (commonly dated 1274 BCE) was 20,000–25,000 soldiers. This was a very large army by the standards of the time. Yet the total population of Egypt was about 2–3 million, so the army constituted 1% of the population at most. This was very much the standard in large states and empires throughout history because of the great financial and logistical problems of maintaining large armies for long periods at great distances from home. Thus, in comparison to the high military participation rates of small-scale tribal societies, participation rates, and hence war casualties, in large states’ armies were much lower. Moreover, in contrast to the great vulnerability of women and children in small-scale tribal warfare, the civilian population of Egypt was sheltered by distance from the theaters of military operations and not often exposed to the horrors of war. Such relative security, interrupted only by large-scale invasions, is one of the main reasons why societies experienced great demographic growth after the emergence of the state. It is also the reason why civil war, when the war rages within the country, tends to be the most lethal form of war, as Hobbes very well realized. Warfare and feuds in the pre- and early-modern eras Levy & Thompson further posit that between the 14th and early 19th centuries, Europe was the scene of a second ‘acceleration’ in the historical trajectory of violence. This is very much in line with the prevailing perceptions regarding early modern European history, but these perceptions are most probably wrong, and for the same reason as before: Levy & Thompson count absolute battle casualties, and obviously states became more centralized during this period and armies grew in number, so battles also grew in size. Yet it was the anarchy and feudal fragmentation in Europe between the fall of the Roman Empire and 1200 that were responsible for the pervasive insecurity and endemic violence that characterized the Dark Ages and resulted in, among other things, a sharp demographic decline. Again, small-scale usually meant more, not less, violent mortality. The focus on early modern Europe is misleading also in another way: in the late Middle Ages the Mongol conquests inflicted on the societies of China, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe casualties and destruction that were among the highest ever suffered during historical times. Estimates of the sharp decline experienced by the populations of China and Russia, for example, vary widely. Still, even by the lowest estimates they were at least as great, and in China almost definitely much greater, than the Soviet Union’s horrific rate in World War II of about 15%. The receding of medieval anarchy in the face of the growing European state-Leviathans was the first step towards a steep decline in the continent’s violent mortality rate beginning in early modernity and continuing to the present day. The studies and data cited by Pinker with respect to the domestic aspect of this trend are strikingly paralleled by those of Robert Muchembled’s History of Violence (2012). The work of a historian, the book meticulously documents, on the basis of French legal records, a 20-fold decrease in homicide rates between the 13th and 20th centuries. Earlier studies of other parts of Europe, starting with Gurr (1981), have come up with similar findings. Like Pinker, Muchembled attributes the steep decline to the state’s growing authority, as its justice system effectively replaced and deterred ‘private justice’, vendetta, and pervasive violence, all of them endemic in unruly societies. Correspondingly, again like Pinker, Muchembled invokes Norbert Elias’s (2000) ‘civilizing process’, whereby the defense of honor by sword and knife, a social norm and imperative in most traditional societies, is gradually given up among both the nobility and the general populace. The civilizing process is partly a function of the growing authority of the state’s rule and justice system. But there were other factors involved, which Pinker excels in identifying and weaving together. Although he is not a historian, his historical synthesis is exemplarily rich and nuanced. He specifies the growing humanitarian sensibilities in Europe of the Enlightenment, which he traces to, among other things, the gradual improvement in living conditions, growing commercial spirit and, above all, the print revolution with the attendant values and habits of reasoning, introspection, and empathy that it inculcated among the reading elites. As Pinker points out, not only did homicide rates decline but also other previously common forms of violence, such as judicial disembowelment and torture, were becoming unacceptable by the 18th century. This was the beginning of a continuous process which during the following centuries would bring about, among other things, the abolition of slavery and the decline of capital punishment, tyranny, and political violence in the developed world – most notably in the areas where the values of Enlightenment humanitarianism triumphed. Both Pinker and Muchembled identify a change in the trend towards increased violence and homicide rates in the United States and Europe from the 1960s on. They attribute this change (Pinker is particularly elaborative here) to the erosion of public authority and some reversal of the ‘civilizing process’ with the cults of youth culture, defiance of authority, radical ideologies of violence by the ‘oppressed’, and the fragmentation of the stable family structure. Pinker identifies a return to a downward trend in violence from about 1990 on, which he attributes to an ebbing of much of the above through reasserted state action and changes in the public mood. A last point worth mentioning in this context: Muchembled reveals that throughout the steep decline in homicide rates, from medieval times to the present, 90% or more of all cases have been perpetrated by men, especially between the ages of 20 and 30 years old. As Daly & Wilson (1988: 145–149) have shown, this ratio is found in each and every society studied around the globe, from hunter-gatherers to agricultural and industrial societies, irrespective of the vastly different homicide rates among them. Previous Section Next Section The decline of war and the three `Long Peaces' after 1815 We now move to the decline of war, which is our main concern here. Most people are surprised to learn that the occurrence of war and overall mortality in war sharply decreased after 1815, most notably in the developed world. The ‘Long Peace’ among the great powers after 1945 is more recognized and is widely attributed to the nuclear factor, a decisive factor to be sure, which concentrated the minds of all the protagonists wonderfully. The (inter-)democratic peace has been equally recognized. But in actuality, the decrease in war had been very marked before the nuclear era and encompassed both democracies and non-democracies. In the century after 1815, wars among economically advanced countries declined in their frequency to about one-third of what they had been in the previous centuries, an unprecedented change. Indeed, the Long Peace after 1945 was preceded by the second longest peace among the great powers, between 1871 and 1914, and by the third longest peace, between 1815 and 1854 (Gat, 2006: 536–537, 608). Thus, the three longest periods of peace by far in the modern great powers system all occurred after 1815. Clearly, one needs to explain the entire trend, while also accounting for the glaring divergence from it: the two World Wars. Previous Section Next Section Is modern war more lethal and destructive than before? In his earlier works, Levy (1983) was among the first to document the much-reduced frequency of war after 1815. But what brought about this change? Levy & Thompson assume – this is perhaps the most natural hypothesis – that wars declined in frequency because they became too lethal, destructive, and expensive. Supposedly, a trade-off of sorts was created between the intensity and frequency of warfare: fewer, larger wars supplanting many smaller ones. This hypothesis barely holds, however, because, again, relative to population and wealth wars have not become more lethal and costly than earlier in history. Furthermore, as Levy & Thompson rightly document, the wars of the 19th century – the most peaceful century in European history – were particularly light, in comparative terms, so there is no trade-off here. True, the World Wars, especially World War II, were certainly on the upper scale of the range in terms of casualties. Yet, as already noted, they were far from being exceptional in history. Once more, we need to look at relative casualties, general human mortality in any number of wars that happen to rage around the world, rather than at the aggregate created by the fact that many states participated in the World Wars. I have already mentioned the Mongol invasions, but other examples abound. In the first three years of the Second Punic War, 218–16 BCE, Rome lost some 50,000 citizens of the ages of 17–46, out of a total of about 200,000 in that age demographic (Brunt, 1971). This was roughly 25% of the military-age cohorts in only three years, the same range as the Russian and higher than the German rates in World War II. This, and the devastation of Rome’s free peasantry during the Second Punic War, did not reduce Rome’s propensity for war thereafter. During the Thirty Years War (1618–48) population loss in Germany is estimated at between one-fifth and one-third – either way higher than the German casualties in World War I and World War II combined. People often assume that more developed military technology during modernity means greater lethality and destruction, but in fact it also means greater protective power, as with mechanized armor, mechanized speed and agility, and defensive electronic measures. Offensive and defensive advances generally rise in tandem. In addition, it is all too often forgotten that the vast majority of the many millions of non-combatants killed by Germany during World War II – Jews, Soviet prisoners of war, Soviet civilians – fell victim to intentional starvation, exposure to the elements, and mass executions rather than to any sophisticated military technology. Instances of genocide in general during the 20th century, much as earlier in history, were carried out with the simplest of technologies, as the Rwanda genocide horrifically reminded us. Nor have wars during the past two centuries been economically more costly than they were earlier in history, again relative to overall wealth. War has always involved massive economic exertion and has been the single most expensive item of state spending (e.g. massively documented, Bonney, 1999). Examples are countless, and it will suffice to mention that both 16th- and 17th-century Spain and 18th-century France were economically ruined by war and staggering war debts, which in the French case brought about the Revolution. Furthermore, death by starvation in premodern wars was widespread. Previous Section Next Section Is it peace that has become more profitable? So if wars have not become more costly and destructive during the past two centuries then why have they receded, particularly in the developed world? The answer is the advent of the industrial–commercial revolution after 1815, the most profound transformation of human society since the Neolithic adoption of agriculture. The correlation between the decline of war in the developed world and the process of modernization, both unfolding since 1815, is surely not accidental, and the causation is not difficult to locate. In the first place, given explosive growth in per capita wealth, about 30- to 50-fold thus far, the Malthusian trap has been broken. Wealth no longer constitutes a fundamentally finite quantity, and wealth acquisition progressively **shifted** away **from a zero-sum game**. Secondly, economies are no longer overwhelmingly autarkic, **instead having become increasingly interconnected** by specialization, scale, and exchange. Consequently, foreign devastation potentially depressed the entire system and was thus **detrimental to a state’s own wellbeing**. This reality, already noted by Mill (1848/1961: 582), starkly manifested itself after World War I, as Keynes (1920) had anticipated in his criticism of the reparations imposed on Germany. Thirdly, greater economic **openness has decreased the likelihood of war by disassociating economic access from the confines of political borders and sovereignty**. It is no longer necessary to **politically possess a territory in order benefit** from it. Of the above three factors, the second one – commercial interdependence – has attracted most of the attention in the literature. But the other two factors have been no less significant. Thus, the greater **the yield of competitive economic cooperation, the more counterproductive and less attractive conflict becomes**. Rather than war becoming more costly, as is widely believed, **it is in fact peace that has been growing more profitable.** Referring to my argument in this regard, Levy & Thompson (2011: 72–75) excused themselves from deciding on the issue on the grounds of insufficient information regarding the cost of premodern war. But as already noted, the information on the subject is quite clear.

#### Neoliberalism is key to maintain the free market, the value of an individual, and free trade

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Within higher education neoliberalism has introduced a new mode of regulation or form of governmentality. In order to understand this it is necessary to understand that the welfare liberal mode it replaced maintained fundamentally different premises at the level of political and economic theory, as well as at the level of philosophical assumption. The central defining characteristic of this new brand of neoliberalism can be understood at one level as a revival of many of the central tenets of classical liberalism, particularly classical economic liberalism. The central presuppositions shared include: 1. The self-interested individual: a view of individuals as economically self-interested subjects. In this perspective the individual was represented as a rational optimizer and the best judge of his/her own interests and needs. 2. Free market economics: the best way to allocate resources and opportunities is through the market. The market is both a more efficient mechanism and a morally superior mechanism. 3. A commitment to laissez-faire: because the free market is a self-regulating order it regulates itself better than the government or any other outside force. In this, neoliberals show a distinct distrust of governmental power and seek to limit state power within a negative conception, limiting its role to the protection of individual rights. 4. A commitment to free trade: involving the abolition of tariffs or subsidies, or any form of state-imposed protection or support, as well as the maintenance of floating exchange rates and ‘open’ economies.

#### Capitalism and Globalization are good—it’s responsible for most of the good in the world. The root cause of structural violence is a lack of free markets. Areas that have started to develop must transition to the next level of capitalism or they will be locked in misery for a very long time – key to the environment and freedom

Goklany 7 (Indur, scholar who has 25 years of experience working and writing on global and national environmental issues. He has published several peer-reviewed papers and book chapters on an array of issues Author of The Improving State of the World: Why We're Living Longer, Healthier, More Comfortable Lives on a Cleaner Planet, Mar. 23, http://www.reason.com/news/show/119252.html, twm)

Environmentalists and globalization foes are united in their fear that greater population and consumption of energy, materials, and chemicals accompanying economic growth, technological change and free trade—the mainstays of globalization—degrade human and environmental well-being. Indeed, the 20th century saw the United States’ population multiply by four, income by seven, carbon dioxide emissions by nine, use of materials by 27, and use of chemicals by more than 100. Yet life expectancy increased from 47 years to 77 years. Onset of major disease such as cancer, heart, and respiratory disease has been postponed byetween eight and eleven years in the past century. Heart disease and cancer rates have been in rapid decline over the last two decades, and total cancer deaths have actually declined the last two years, despite increases in population. Among the very young, infant mortality has declined from 100 deaths per 1,000 births in 1913 to just seven per 1,000 today. These improvements haven’t been restricted to the United States. It’s a global phenomenon. Worldwide, life expectancy has more than doubled, from 31 years in 1900 to 67 years today. India’s and China’s infant mortalities exceeded 190 per 1,000 births in the early 1950s; today they are 62 and 26, respectively. In the developing world, the proportion of the population suffering from chronic hunger declined from 37 percent to 17 percent between 1970 and 2001 despite a 83 percent increase in population. Globally average annual incomes in real dollars have tripled since 1950. Consequently, the proportion of the planet's developing-world population living in absolute poverty has halved since 1981, from 40 percent to 20 percent. Child labor in low income countries declined from 30 percent to 18 percent between 1960 and 2003. Equally important, the world is more literate and better educated than ever. People are freer politically, economically, and socially to pursue their well-being as they see fit. More people choose their own rulers, and have freedom of expression. They are more likely to live under rule of law, and less likely to be arbitrarily deprived of life, limb, and property. Social and professional mobility have also never been greater. It’s easier than ever for people across the world to transcend the bonds of caste, place, gender, and other accidents of birth. People today work fewer hours and have more money and better health to enjoy their leisure time than their ancestors. Man’s environmental record is more complex. The early stages of development can indeed cause some environmental deterioration as societies pursue first-order problems affecting human well-being. These include hunger, malnutrition, illiteracy, and lack of education, basic public health services, safe water, sanitation, mobility, and ready sources of energy. Because greater wealth alleviates these problems while providing basic creature comforts, individuals and societies initially focus on economic development, often neglecting other aspects of environmental quality. In time, however, they recognize that environmental deterioration reduces their quality of life. Accordingly, they put more of their recently acquired wealth and human capital into developing and implementing cleaner technologies. This brings about an environmental transition via the twin forces of economic development and technological progress, which begin to provide solutions to environmental problems instead of creating those problems. All of which is why we today find that the richest countries are also the cleanest. And while many developing countries have yet to get past the “green ceiling,” they are nevertheless ahead of where today’s developed countries used to be when they were equally wealthy. The point of transition from "industrial period" to "environmental conscious" continues to fall. For example, the US introduced unleaded gasoline only after its GDP per capita exceeded $16,000. India and China did the same before they reached $3,000 per capita. This progress is a testament to the power of globalization and the transfer of ideas and knowledge (that lead is harmful, for example). It's also testament to the importance of trade in transferring technology from developed to developing countries—in this case, the technology needed to remove lead from gasoline. This hints at the answer to the question of why some parts of the world have been left behind while the rest of the world has thrived. Why have improvements in well-being stalled in areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab world? The proximate cause of improvements in well-being is a “cycle of progress” composed of the mutually reinforcing forces of economic development and technological progress. But that cycle itself is propelled by a web of essential institutions, particularly property rights, free markets, and rule of law. Other important institutions would include science- and technology-based problem-solving founded on skepticism and experimentation; receptiveness to new technologies and ideas; and freer trade in goods, services—most importantly in knowledge and ideas. In short, free and open societies prosper. Isolation, intolerance, and hostility to the free exchange of knowledge, technology, people, and goods breed stagnation or regression.

#### Rejection fails-leaves people politically immobile due to lack of vision.

**Ferguson, Stanford anthropology chair and professor, 2010**

(James, “Toward a left art of government: from ‘Foucauldian critique’ to Foucauldian politics”,History of the Human Sciences 2011 24: 61, SAGE)

One of the founding premises of this special issue and the conference with which it began is that Foucault has been read, and used, in different ways in different academic disciplines. In this article I will discuss one common way of using Foucault’s thought in my own discipline of anthropology. I will suggest that the strategy of using Foucauldian modes of analysis to ‘critique power’ (as it is often put) has frequently led to a rather sterile form of political engagement. Attention to some of Foucault’s own remarks about politics hints at a different political sensibility, in which empirical experimentation rather than moralistic denunciation takes center place. I will reference some examples of such experimentation that come out of my current research on the politics of social assistance in southern Africa (though I do not have space here to give a full exposition of these). The sort of use of Foucault that I have in mind is well represented in the anthropology of development (and the related field of what is sometimes called critical development studies). Here, the characteristic strategy is to use Foucauldian analysis to reveal the way that interventions, projects, etc., which claim to be merely technical or benevolent, really involve relations of power. This is a perfectly reasonable thing to do, but too often, in this field, such a simple demonstration is apparently seen as the end of the exercise. Power has been ‘critiqued’, an oppressive system has been exposed as such, and that seems to be taken as a satisfactory end to the matter. This impasse in development studies and anthropology is related, I think, to a wider predicament that progressive or left politics seems to find itself in today. The predicament is that the left seems increasingly to be defined by a series of gestures of refusal – what I call ‘the antis’ (anti-globalization, anti-neo-liberalism, anti-privatization, anti-Bush, sometimes even anti-capitalism – but always ‘anti’, never ‘pro’). The current world system, the politics of the ‘anti-’ points out, rests on inequality and exploitation. The global poor are being screwed, while the rich are benefiting. The powerless are getting the short end of the stick. This is all perfectly true, of course, if not terribly illuminating. But such lines of argument typically have very little to propose by way of an alternative ‘art of government’. Governing is exercising power over others, which is what the powerful do to the downtrodden. It appears as something to be resisted or denounced, not improved or experimented with. My first observation about this sort of analysis is that it rests on what seems tome a very un-Foucauldian idea of the political. Foucault did, certainly, valorize certain forms of resistance, and worked tirelessly to undermine and denaturalize taken-for-granted arrangements of power. But he never suggested that power ought not be exercised, or that it was illegitimate for someto seek to govern the conduct of others.On the contrary, he repeatedly insisted that it made no sense (in his scheme of things) to wish for a world without power.1 Naive readings of Foucault turned his skeptical analytics of power into a simple denunciation. Thus the question (once posed to him by an interviewer) of whether it would be an intolerable use of power for a parent to prevent a child from scribbling on the walls of a house. Foucault’s instructive answer was: If I accepted the picture of power that is frequently adopted – namely, that it’s something horrible and repressive for the individual – it’s clear that preventing a child from scribbling would be an unbearable tyranny. But that’s not it. I say that power is a relation. A relation in which one guides the behavior of others. And there’s no reason why this manner of guiding the behavior of others should not ultimately have results which are positive, valuable, interesting, and so on. If I had a kid, I assure you he would not write on the walls – or if he did, it would be against my will. The very idea! (Foucault, 1988a: 11–13) In the same interview, he complained of those who . . . think I’m a sort of radical anarchist who has an absolute hatred of power. No! What I’m trying to do is to approach this extremely important and tangled phenomenon in our society, the exercise of power, with the most reflective, and I would say prudent, attitude. . . . To question the relations of power in the most scrupulous and attentive manner possible, looking into all the domains of its exercise, that’s not the same thing as constructing a mythology of power as the beast of the apocalypse. (ibid.: 11–13) In fact, Foucault was as fascinated and attracted by power as he was by resistance, and his fundamental concern was with how (not whether) power is exercised. This led him, naturally enough, to the problem of government, which he inevitably took up as a pragmatic puzzle. Some contemporary practitioners of what I have termed ‘Foucauldian critique’ seem to think it is some sort of scandal that people should be governed at all – supposing it to be somehow illegitimate that some should seek to guide the conduct of others. But Foucault took a deep and largely sympathetic interest in the development of what he called ‘arts of government’. Indeed, he once suggested (in a provocative set of remarks on neo-liberalism) that while the right had, in the mid- to late 20th century, invented powerful new arts of government, the left had suffered from the ‘absence of a socialist art of government’, and a historic failure to develop an ‘autonomous governmentality’ comparable to liberalism (Foucault, 2008: 93–4). This observation leads to a question that must be a central one for what I am here terming ‘Foucauldian politics’. That is: What might a genuinely ‘left’ art of government look like? And where might we find the specific governmental techniques and rationalities that might enable such an art? Looking at the world as a whole – and especially at the poorest and most disadvantaged parts of it, in which both I and my discipline have long taken a special interest – it seems evident that we can only answer such questions if we are willing to question some of the foundational assumptions that have dominated left thought throughout the last century or more. Let me cite just two reasons for this. First, in much of the world (and especially in the poorest parts of it), formal wage labor does not play the central role that so much left thought ascribes to it. The semimythical figure of the proletarian was, of course, at the heart of ideologies of state socialism, even as the extraction of labor was foundational to its political economy. But the ‘able bodied worker’ was hardly less central to the workings of social democracies and welfare states, where Keynesian policies implied a kind of pact between capital and labor, mediated by the state. ‘Society’, in such a scheme, was grounded on the (normatively male) wage earning worker and ‘his family’, while ‘social welfare’ intervention was available for those left outside the security of labor (whether through injury, old age, or periodic dips in the business cycle). Insurance rationality provided the technical means for universalizing certain sorts of social citizenship (at the level of the nation-state) on the basis of the non-universal (but sufficiently widespread) social condition of wage labor. This template never really applied very well to Africa, where wage laborers have always been a small minority of the population. And it applies even less well today, when economic restructuring and de-industrialization have meant that formal wage employment is ever more the exception than the rule. In the rapidly expanding cities of today’s Africa, the great mass of the population is not ‘employed’ in the usual sense of the word, and increasingly lacks connections (or rights) to land as well. Neither workers nor peasants, they dwell in the socalled ‘informal economy’, eking out a meagre survival through an impressive range of improvised bits of this and that (cf. Davis, 2007). The poverty of our analytical vocabulary in describing such people and their way of life (Are they ‘the lumpen’? ‘The youth’? ‘The informal’ – whatever that means?) ismatched by our inability to conceive of forms of politics that would given them a central place. Certainly, the old left strategy of dismissing such people as a residual and degenerate fringe (Marx’s ‘lumpenproletariat’) can hardly suffice when we are talking (as we often are today) about the majority of the population. The second challenge I wish to note to conventional left thinking is the rise of forms of social assistance that bypass nation-states. The usual left stance identifies ‘neo-liberalism’ as the enemy of the state, and thus of such social goods as welfare and pensions. But in much of Africa, most forms of ‘social assistance’ are funded and implemented by non-state agencies. This has long been the case, in many areas, thanks to the key role of Christian missions in providing education, health care and other social services from the colonial era onward. The NGO revolution of the recent decades has only accentuated the pattern, to the point where many of the key governmental relations that servicer eceiving Africans have are not with state bureaucracies, but with NGOs funded by transnational philanthropic foundations. The most common left response to this transnationalization of ‘the social’ has been to oppose such developments (again, the ‘anti’), and to defend the sovereignty of African states, which are imagined as being (at least potentially) the agents of development and resistors of imperialism. Such stances have sometimes been justified, but they have not led to very effective forms of politics. Might another sort of left politics not be possible – one that would look forward and try to identify new possibilities and openings in the current transnational regime, instead of looking back to an (often misremembered or idealized) era of sovereign ‘developmental states’? And (crucially for my purposes here), might it not be possible to identify or discover new ‘arts of government’ that might take advantage of (rather than simply fighting against) recent transformations in the spatial organization of government and social assistance? This is the sort of rethinking that will be necessary if we are to get beyond the politics of the ‘anti’ and arrive at a convincing response to Foucault’s challenge to develop a true left art of government. Such rethinking will have to be willing to decenter the two sacred touchstones of 20th-century progressive politics – the worker and the nation-state – while finding or reinventing techniques of government that can gain traction in settings where most of ‘the masses’ are not workers, and most social services are not delivered by states. In such circumstances, simply attacking ‘neo-liberalism’ and defending ‘the welfare state’ is not terribly helpful. What is needed instead is a revitalized notion of the political good – and of what ‘social assistance’ might mean in a world where so many of the assumptions of the Keynesian welfare state no longer obtain. In matters of ‘social policy’, Foucault’s 1983 observation remains true nearly a quarter-century later: We are still bound up with an outlook that was formed between 1920 and 1940, mainly under the influence of Beveridge, a man who was born over a hundred years ago. For the moment . . . we completely lack the intellectual tools necessary to envisage in new terms the form in which we might attain what we are looking for. (Foucault, 1988b: 166) My recent work is concerned with empirical domains in which some of the conceptual innovation that Foucault called for may be under way. Perhaps the most provocative finding to date is that some of the most interesting and promising new forms of government being devised seem to be taking market mechanisms that we are used to associating with neo-liberalism, and putting them to new political uses. Consider, for instance, new anti-poverty programs in southern Africa that seek to provide cash support for incomes, and thus (in theory) harness markets to the task of meeting the needs of the poor. This is happening in several African countries, but also in a great many other postcolonial states – from Brazil and Venezuela to Mexico and Bangladesh – where leftist and rightist regimes alike have seen fit to introduce policies that transfer cash directly into the hands of the poor (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009; cf. Ferguson, 2010). The South African Basic Income Grant campaign is the example I know best. This involves a proposal to deal with a crisis of persistent poverty by providing a small unconditional minimum monthly payment to all. The argument goes like this: markets are not working for poor people because they are too poor to participate in them. Government programs are not working for them because the state is inefficient. So: provide income support directly, in the form of cash, then say to the poor: ‘You are now empowered to solve your own problems in the way you see best.’ In contrast to older forms of ‘welfare’ assistance, the claim is that such grants rely on poor people’s own ability to solve their own problems, without imposing the policing, paternalism and surveillance of the traditional welfare state. The ‘social’ of the social welfare state is largely discarded, in this scheme. Assistance is largely decoupled from familistic assumptions and insurance rationality alike, while the state is imagined as both universally engaged (as a kind of direct provider for each and every citizen) and maximally disengaged (taking no real interest in shaping the conduct of those under its care, who are seen as knowing their own needs better than the state does). (See Standing and Samson, 2003; Barchiesi, 20007; Ferguson, 2007.) Similar new lines of thought are visible in recent campaigns for an increased role for direct cash transfers in many forms of social and humanitarian policy. For instance, an increasingly influential argument in the area of humanitarian assistance maintains that hunger is best dealt with by boosting the purchasing power of those at risk, rather than by distributing food aid. The current international food aid system involves taking excess grain (produced under subsidized conditions in rich countries) and transporting it to places (largely in Africa) where people are at risk of hunger. Following Amartya Sen, critics have long noted the perverse effects of this: depressing producer prices for local farmers, and damaging the local institutions for producing and distributing food crops. Once food aid has arrived, local food production often never recovers, and the ‘temporary’ crisis becomes permanent. As an alternative, Sen’s followers have pushed for cash payments to be made directly to those at risk of food deficit. People with money in their pockets, Sen points out, do not starve. And the economic chain of events that is set in motion by boosting purchasing power leads (through market forces) to increased capacity for local production and distribution (Sen, 1983; Dreze and Sen, 1991). The argument recalls Jane Guyer’s groundbreaking work on feeding African cities (1989). Consider, Guyer suggests, how food ends up in bellies in the vast mega-cities of West Africa such as Lagos. The logistical task of moving thousands of tons of food each day fromthousands of local producers to millions of urban consumerswould be beyond the organizational capacity of any state (to say nothing of the less-than-exemplary Nigerian one). Here, market mechanisms, drawing on the power of vast self-organizing networks, are very powerful, and very efficient. Such forms of organization must appear especially attractive where states lack capacity (and let us remember how many progressive dreams in Africa have crashed on the rocks of low state capacity). Why should relying on this sort of mechanism be inherently right-wing? Well, the answer is obvious: markets serve only those with purchasing power. But the food aid example shows a way of redirecting markets toward the poor, by intervening not to restrict the market, but to boost purchasing power. I have become convinced that (at least in the case of food aid) this is good public policy. Is it also neo-liberal? Perhaps that is not the right question. Let us rather ask: Are there specific sorts of social policy that might draw on characteristic neo-liberal ‘moves’ (like using markets to deliver services) that would also be genuinely pro-poor? That seems to me a question worth asking. It seems clear that the governmental programs I have discussed here do draw on recognizably neo-liberal elements (including the valorization of market efficiency, individual choice and autonomy; themes of entrepreneurship; and skepticism about the state as a service provider).2 But those who advocate and fight for these policies would insist that they are, in fact ‘pro-poor’, and that they are ways of fighting against (rather than capitulating to) the growing inequality that recent ‘neo-liberal’ economic restructuring has produced. These claims, I think, are not easily dismissed. And this, in turn, raises the fascinating possibility that the ‘neo-liberal’ and the ‘pro-poor’ may not be so automatically opposed as we are used to supposing. What is of special interest here is the way that certain sorts of new progressive initiatives may involve not simply ‘opposing the neo-liberal project’, but appropriating key mechanisms of neo-liberal government for different ends. This does not mean that these political projects are therefore suspect – ‘contaminated’ by their association with neo-liberal rationality. Rather, it means that they are appropriating certain characteristic neo-liberal ‘moves’ (and I think of these discursive and programmatic moves as analogous to the moves one might make in a game) that while recognizably ‘neo-liberal’, can be used for quite different purposes than that term usually implies. As I have argued in a related paper (Ferguson, 2010), this situation may be analogous to the way that statistical techniques that were developed in the 19th century for calculating the probabilities of workplace injuries eventually became building blocks of the insurance techniques that enabled the rise of the welfare state. Such techniques were originally developed in the 19th century by large employers to control costs, but they eventually became the technical basis for social insurance, and ultimately helped enable unprecedented gains for the working class across much of the world (Ewald, 1986). Techniques have no necessary loyalty to the political program within which they were developed, and mechanisms of government that were invented to serve one purpose can easily enough be appropriated for surprising other uses. ‘Market’ techniques of government such as those I have discussed were, like workplace statistics, undoubtedly conservative in their original uses. But it seems at least possible that they may be in the process of being creatively appropriated, and repurposed for different and more progressive sorts of ends. To be sure: we need to be skeptical about the facile idea that problems of poor people can be solved simply by inviting them to participate in markets and enterprise. Such claims (which often ascribe almost magical transformative powers to such unlikely vehicles as ‘social entrepreneurship’ or ‘microcredit’) are almost always misleading, and often fraudulent. But it would be a mistake to dismiss the coupling of pro-poor social policy with market mechanisms out of hand, out of a reflexive sense that the latter are ‘neo-liberal’ and thus ‘bad’. Again, my interest here is in the potential mobility of a set of governmental devices. These devices originated within a neo-liberal project that deserves all the criticism it gets. But they may be in the process of being redeployed in creative ways. If so, some emergent political initiatives that might appear at first blush to be worryingly ‘neo-liberal’ may, on closer inspection, amount to something a good deal more hopeful. This leaves us with a politics that requires more of us than simply denouncing neo-liberalism. The political demands and policy measures I have mentioned here (whether conditional cash transfers, basic income, or cash-based food aid) do not merit, I think, either wholesale denunciation or uncritical acceptance. Instead, they call on us to remain skeptical and vigilant, but also curious and hopeful. They leave us less with strong opinions than with the sense that we need to think about them a bit more, and learn a bit more about the specific empirical effects that they may produce. Are cash transfers, for instance, a device for demobilizing the poor (as some traditional Marxists claim) – effectively buying the political quiescence of those who have the most to gain from radical social change for a paltry sum? Or do they have the contrary effect, as many proponents of basic income argue – opening up a new space of mobilization and political demand by radically decoupling labor and consumption and opening a new domain of decommodification? This is not a question to be answered theoretically or ideologically; the only answer that really convinces is the empirical and experimental one: Let us find out! Such a stance, I suggest, brings us much closer toward a truly Foucauldian politics. For politics, for Foucault, was always more about experimentation than denunciation. In an interview on social security, Foucault insisted that what was required for a progressive rethinking of social policy was not a theoretically derived ‘line’, but, as he put it, ‘a certain empiricism’. We have to transform the field of social institutions into a vast experimental field, in such a way as to decide which taps need turning, which bolts need to be loosened here or there, to get the desired change. . . . What we have to do . . . is to increase the experiments wherever possible in this particularly interesting and important area of social life. (Foucault, 1988b: 165) What this implies is a form of politics that has less to do with critique and denunciation than with experimentation and assessment. It is a matter not of refusing power, but rather exercising it in a way that would be provisional, reversible, and open to surprise. If we are indeed to arrive at viable left ‘arts of government’, we will need to be open to the unexpected, ready to ‘increase the experiments wherever possible’, and attentive to the ways that governmental techniques originally deployed for nefarious purposes can be appropriated toward other ends. To do this, we will need to forgo the pleasures of the easy, dismissive critique, and instead turn a keen and sympathetic eye toward the rich world of actual social and political practice, the world of tap-turning and experimentation. That is a world still full of invention and surprise, where the landscape of political possibility and constraint that we have come to take for granted is being redrawn, even as we speak.

#### Neolib solves warming-allows the greatest adaptive capacity and improves human wellbeing that overwhelms negative effects.

**Goklany, Assistant Director for Science and Technology Policy, 2007**

(Indur, “IS A RICHER-BUT-WARMER WORLD BETTER THAN POORER-BUT-COOLER WORLDS?”, <http://www.ce.cmu.edu/~gdrg/readings/2006/02/14/Goklany_160.pdf>)

Table 10 indicates that notwithstanding gross inflation of the adverse impacts of climate change, welfare should be higher in 2100 than it was in 1990 under all scenarios. Remarkably, even after accounting for climate change, welfare in developing countries (on average) should be higher in 2100 than it was for developed countries in 1990 for all but the A2 scenario. This also calls into question arguments that present generations are morally bound to take aggressive actions now to mitigate climate change because future generations will, otherwise, be worse off in the future. Future generations will not only be better off, they should also have at their disposal better and more effective technologies and greater human capital to address not just climate change but any other sources of adversity. Second, well-being in 2100 should, in the aggregate, be highest for the richest-but warmest (A1FI) scenario and lowest for the poorest (A2) scenario. This conclusion was reached despite the previously noted tendency of impacts analyses to overestimate net adverse impacts, especially for wealthier societies. To summarize, over this century the SRES scenario that leads to the greatest risk of climate change is also the one that leads to the greatest gains in human welfare. Notwithstanding climate change, through this century human well-being is likely to be highest in the richest-but-warmest (A1FI) world and lower in poorer-but-cooler worlds. Thus, if humanity could choose between the four scenarios examined here, it should for the next few decades strive to realize the richest-but-warmest (A1FI) world. Strictly from the perspective of human well-being, the richest-but-warmest world characterized by the A1FI scenario would probably be superior to the poorer-but-cooler worlds at least through 2085, particularly if one considers the numerous ways GDP per capita advances human well-being. Human well-being would likely be the lowest for the poorest (A2) world. With respect to environmental well-being, the FTA’s results suggest matters may be best in the A1FI world for some critical environmental indicators through 2100, but not necessarily for others. On the other hand, the Stern Review’s worst-case results for potential welfare losses due to climate change suggest that, welfare, adjusted for market and non-market impacts and the risk of catastrophe due to climate change, will be highest under the A1FI scenario, at least through 2100. It should however be noted that the results of this paper would not by themselves justify any inference that intervening to mitigate the impacts of climate change, either through limiting emissions and concentrations of greenhouse gases or through adaptation, would reduce welfare by making us poorer. That needs a different type of economic analysis involving, among other things, analysis of the marginal costs and benefits of various interventions and include consideration of co-benefits of adaptation and mitigation and opportunity costs (Goklany, 2007a), which is outside the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, the above results cast doubt on a key premise implicit in all calls to steer the world toward lower emission pathways and to take actions now that would go beyond “no-regret” policies in order to reduce GHG emissions in the near term, namely, a richer but-warmer world will, before too long, necessarily be worse for the globe than a poorer but-cooler world. But the above analysis suggests this is unlikely to occur, at least not before the 2085–2100 period, and that in the short-to-medium term, societies should strive to advance their level of economic development and their ability to develop, implement and acquire new and improved technologies while simultaneously implementing “no regret” actions to mitigate climate change and reduce vulnerability to current climate sensitive problems that might be exacerbated by climate change (Goklany, 2005, 2007a).

#### Globalization solves poverty and repression

**Chen,** Minnesota law school professor**, 2k**

(Jim, “ESSAY: PAX MERCATORIA: GLOBALIZATION AS A SECOND CHANCE AT "PEACE FOR OUR TIME”, 24 Fordham Int'l L.J. 217, lexis)

The antiglobalization movement has made some extraordinary claims. Let us transplant a precept of natural science into this social realm: n177 extraordinary claims demand extraordinary proof. n178 From Seattle to Prague, protesters have argued that the organs of international economic law conspire with multinational corporations to sap national and local governments of legitimate power, to destabilize global security, and to poison workplaces as well as ecosystems. n179 That case has not met even the most generous standard of proof. The antiglobalization movement has failed to refute the following: Dramatic improvements in welfare at every wealth and income [\*246] level. n180 Since 1820 global wealth has expanded tenfold, thanks largely to technological advances and the erosion of barriers to trade. n181 The world economic order, simply put, is lifting people out of poverty. According to the World Bank, the percentage of the world's population living in extreme poverty fell from 28.3 to 23.4% between 1987 and 1998. n182 (The World Bank defines extreme and absolute poverty according to "reference lines set at $ 1 and $ 2 per day" in 1993 terms, adjusted for "the relative purchasing power of currencies across countries.") n183 A more optimistic study has concluded that "the share of the world's population earning less than US$ 2 per day shrank by more than half" between 1980 and 1990, "from 34 to 16.6 percent." n184 In concrete terms, "economic growth associated with globalization" over the course of that decade helped lift 1.4 billion people out of absolute poverty. n185 Whatever its precise magnitude, this improvement in global welfare has taken place because of, not in spite of, flourishing world trade. n186 The meaning of American victory in the Cold War. The liberal democracies of the north Atlantic alliance decisively defeated their primary political rivals in the Eastern bloc. Capitalism coupled with generous civil liberties crushed central planning coupled with dictatorship of the proletariat. "America, so the world supposes, won the Cold War." n187 And the world is right. The true nature of the environmental crisis. The most serious environmental problems involve "the depletion and destruction of the global commons." n188 Climate change, ozone depletion, [\*247] and the loss of species, habitats, and biodiversity are today's top environmental priorities. n189 None can be solved without substantial economic development and intense international cooperation. The systematic degradation of the biosphere respects no political boundaries. Worse, it is exacerbated by poverty. Of the myriad environmental problems in this mutually dependent world, "persistent poverty may turn out to be the most aggravating and destructive." n190 We must remember "above all else" that "human degradation and deprivation ... constitute the greatest threat not only to national, regional, and world security, but to essential life-supporting ecological systems." n191 The enhancement of individual liberty through globalization. By dislodging local tyrants and ideologies, globalization has minimized the sort of personal abuse that too often seems endemic to one place, one population. n192 The twenty-first century will witness "people voting with their feet to escape from some village elder's idea of how to live, or some London School of Economics graduate's idea of protecting Indian folkways." n193 This changing social reality will undermine the conventional assumption that capital is mobile but labor is immobile. Generations of scholarship on trade and international relations hang in the balance. At the very least we will have to recalibrate existing race-to-the-bottom models and their sensitivity to "giant sucking sounds." [\*248] Nor has localism propounded plausible solutions to challenges such as food security, n194 AIDS and other epidemiological crises, and barriers to full equality for women and children. n195 The localist package of autarky, retaliatory protectionism, and isolationism would be catastrophic. It really is a shame that Ralph Nader will probably not be named "the first U.S. ambassador to North Korea," where he could "get a real taste of what a country that actually follows [his] insane economic philosophy - high protectionism, economic autarky, anti-markets, antiglobalization, anti-multinationals - is like for the people who live there." n196 The policies preferred by the protesters at Seattle and Prague guarantee penury for most, security for some, and power for an unjustly privileged few. That way runs anew the road to serfdom. n197

#### Neolib is key to heg

**Cafruny, Henry Platt Bristol International Affairs professor, 2008**

(Alan, “The Imperial Turn and the Future of Us Hegemony: Terminal Decline or Retrenchment?” 3-25, <http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/5/2/1/0/pages252105/p252105-3.php>)

The role played by U.S. structural financial power in the construction of Europe’s neoliberal project has been analyzed by many scholars (Helleiner, 1994; Gowan, 1999; Seabrooke, 2001; Baker, 2003); Panitch and Gindin, 2005; Cafruny and Ryner, 2007a; Ryner, 2007). However, the relationship between neoliberalism and geopolitics has received less attention**.** In the first part of this chapter I discuss the role of U.S. military power as it has served, in tandem with U.S. structural financial power, to consolidate the turn to neoliberalism in Europe. Beginning in the mid-1990s the United States transformed NATO from a containment-oriented and defensive alliance to an instrument designed to promote the forward expansion of American power across the European continent and into central Asia. This reinforced Europe’s geopolitical dependence on the United States and buttressed neoliberal social forces across the continent. In the second part of the chapter I consider the long-range possibilities for the United States and Europe in view of growing challenges to U.S. power in both its geoeconomic and geopolitical dimensions. The uncertain status of the dollar is the natural accompaniment to relative industrial decline and the transnationalization of production even as U.S. hegemony has been prolonged through financial deregulation and a resultant series of bubbles. In this context the Bush administration’s policy of geopolitical advance and militarization, designed in part to maintain its hold over global energy resources, is a compensatory strategy (Harvey, 2003) that has, however, encountered substantial costs and risks. Notwithstanding the deepening crisis of the U.S. imperium, the possibilities for a European challenge are sharply circumscribed by its subordinate participation within a U.S.-led neoliberal transnational financial order and its related inability to develop an autonomous regional security structure. U.S. power in both its structural financial and military dimensions has been central to the construction and consolidation of a European neoliberalism. It has not, however, led to transnational class formation or the suppression of inter-imperialist rivalry either at the Atlantic level or within the European Union. Neoliberal ideology cements national capitalist classes together in an organic alliance under a declining but still minimally hegemonic U.S. superpower. From within the framework of this intersubjective agreement the United States continues to provide collective goods in the form of liquidity, trade openness, and military security, albeit very much on its own terms as it externalizes its own problems and social contradictions into the international system. In the eurozone mercantilist rivalry has been displaced from the sphere of national monetary policy to “structural labor reform” and, intermittently, fiscal policy. AFTER THE COLD WAR: INTERREGNUM AND RESTORATION OF U.S. COERCIVE SUPREMACY IN EUROPE 3

#### Hegemony solves extinction

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It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force.

As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come.

#### Neolib boosts freedom and peace-strong statistical support.

**Soysa et al.,** Norwegian University of Science and Technology professor, **2011**

(Indra de, “Does Being Bound Together Suﬀocate, or Liberate? The Eﬀects of Economic, Social, and Political Globalization on Human Rights, 1981–2005”, KYKLOS, Vol. 64 – February 2011 – No. 1, 20–53, ebsco)

There is a large volume of research on human rights and their determinants, but theoretical models and empirical evidence on the eﬀects of globalization on the extent of human rights are sparse. The empirical evidence on this subject that does exist assess very simple dimensions of globalization, typically measures such as the level of trade openness or the penetration of FDI (Hafner-Burton 2005). Instead of these commonly-used proxies of globalization, we use an index that aggregates several factors that in combination capture how globalized a country is along three main dimensions—economic, political, and social globalization (Dreher et al. 2008). As far as we are aware, no study has estimated how diﬀerentially these three dimensions of globalization aﬀect government respect for human rights and the degree of political terror, an important normative policy concern as well as a crucial aspect of future socio-political development. We employ panel data for 118 countries for which there is complete data (94 developing and 24 developed countries) over the period 1981–2005 (25 years). Our results are easily summarized: globalization and the disaggregated components along economic, social, and political dimensions predict higher human rights, controlling for a host of other factors. These results are robust to instrumental variables techniques that allow us to assess the endogenous nature of the relationship between human rights and globalization. The results support those who argue that increased globalization could build peace and social progress, net of all the other factors such as democracy and higher levels of income.